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1Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to compare people’s attitudes to inequality at the
end of the 1990s – the qualities they perceive are needed to get ahead, the role of
government and rewards for employment – in Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE) and Western countries. Our data (from the 1999 International Social
Survey Programme) suggest that overall, people in CEE express substantially
more ‘egalitarian’ attitudes than those in the West, even after 10 years of
economic adjustment to the market economy: Eastern Europeans’ much stronger
dislike of existing income differences and their corresponding preference for
governmental redistribution at least partly reflected in the fact that they consider
the factors that actually govern the income generation process (and therefore
constitute the driving forces of income inequality) as not in line with
meritocratic principles, such as effort, intelligence and skills. Surprisingly,
however, they share basically the same values as the West when it comes to the
factors that should in principle determine income. This evidence presents policy-
makers in the transition countries with a challenge. While people support the
notion that incomes should be determined by factors relevant to the working of
market forces – ability to perform on the job, responsibility and education – a lot
of people in Central and Eastern Europe believe that, in reality, many
differences in income do not reflect merit, and – as a result – they are very
concerned about the extent of inequality in their societies.
1. Introduction
The period of economic and political transformation that began around 1990 has
proved to be difficult for most people in the former communist countries of
Europe. Not only has national income declined but also inequality in both
incomes and opportunities has increased. A large number of people in the region
are not only worse off absolutely than they were during the 1980s: the relative
gap between them and the rich in their societies has also widened. While
changes in people’s incomes, measured inequality and subjective well-being in
the region have been relatively well documented, people’s attitudes to the
changed circumstances in which they live have been comparatively under-
researched. This is all the more surprising, given that other research1 – largely
inspired by the transition experience itself – has underlined the crucial role of
people’s support for the success of reforms. At the same time, international
organizations such as the World Bank have expressed concern about people’s
support for the necessary reforms to be undertaken in order to successfully
create a market economy:
1 See e.g. Rodrik (1995) and Fidrmuc (2000).
2 “In the end what matters is people. In the end a country’s transition will be judged by
whether its citizens live better than they did before. Equity – how people share the
benefits and pains of transition – is important.” (World Bank, 1996, p.66)
From this perspective, people’s attitudes to the sharp increase in income
inequality that occurred across most transition countries during the 1990s are
important. We aim in this paper to describe some of these attitudes, to compare
them with those in Western countries, and to hypothesise on what influences
people in the attitudes that they adopt. We would expect the comparison
between East and West to be particularly instructive because it can be used to
determine the extent to which governments in transition countries may suffer a
‘legitimacy deficit’ compared to those in Western countries. A high level of
dissatisfaction with the level of inequality may reflect a high degree of
disillusion with government and political institutions in a given country.
Against this background, our aim is to analyse attitudes to inequality in a
selection of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) after a decade of
transition. We analyse 1999 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data
on attitudes to meritocracy, governments’ role, income inequality and rewards
for employment in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland,
Russia, Slovakia and Slovenia. Although the data do not allow a focus on
Central Asia and Caucasus, the simultaneous presence of countries where
transition is most advanced (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Latvia,
Slovakia, Slovenia), one country that is lagging behind somewhat (Bulgaria) and
one country with the least successful reform efforts in this sample (Russia),
leaves us with a heterogeneous sample of transition countries. We compare our
findings for these countries with a selection of Western industrialized countries.
We analyse three sets of attitudes in this analysis. The first set measures
respondents’ attitudes to inequality in a fairly direct way. The second set relates
to what respondents believe is important in getting ahead. And the third set
covers respondent beliefs about how earnings, the major income source for the
majority of people in every country, should be determined. Our main finding is
that indeed, people in the East tolerate the degree of inequality in their societies
to a much lesser extent than those in the West. This lower tolerance may be
simply seen as reflecting unease with the extent to which inequality has
increased in many of these countries since the early 1990s. As the results show,
it does not appear to be related to attitudes regarding how people believe
earnings should be rewarded – here there are few differences between East and
West. This suggests that more negative attitudes to inequality in the East cannot
simply be dismissed as a ‘socialist’ hangover. Rather, these attitudes may be
associated with a considerable degree of disillusion in the East about what
people believe is important for getting ahead in life: coming from a wealthy
family, knowing the right people and even being corrupt.
3The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
briefly the economic and political background of the transition countries in order
to set the context for the subsequent analysis. Section 3 discusses the factors that
might be expected to account for differences in attitudes across individuals and
countries and presents the results on an aggregate East vs. West level. Section 4
examines the results for individual countries in order to check the robustness of
the obtained aggregate results. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Economic and Political Background
It is unlikely that anybody would choose to live in a highly unequal society if
they were uncertain of their position in the distribution of incomes, talents and
opportunities prior to their insertion in that society. This is one of the key
assumptions made by John Rawls in his Theory of Justice (1971). To put it
another way, while many people may not have a problem with inequality per se,
they may well object if they find themselves among the disadvantaged in
society. Equally, many people in CEECs may not have particularly liked the
constraints on their personal choices and freedom that communist society
imposed on them. But they may have feared for their economic well-being as the
excitement and uncertainties of capitalism came to replace the duller and more
constrained, but also perhaps more secure, life under communism. Certainly,
there is evidence that after an initial flurry of enthusiasm for state withdrawal
from both the social and economic spheres, people in some countries had second
thoughts. In Poland and Hungary, for example, this was reflected in ex-
communist parties being returned to power by popular vote just a few years after
their communist predecessors were so enthusiastically deposed. In most
countries, public support for reforms – as measured in opinion polls – declined
significantly after the early years.2
It is worth briefly examining the background against which respondents’
attitudes to inequality and related issues were recorded in 1999. While average
incomes in general increased throughout the 1990s in Western countries, they
started from a lower base and decreased in nearly all countries in Central and
Eastern Europe, Slovenia and Poland being notable exceptions. The decline in
average incomes was particularly severe in Russia, Bulgaria and Latvia. In
Hungary, an initial decline in the early 1990s was followed by a gradual increase
in the middle to late 1990s.
But East and West did not just differ in terms of average income trajectories.
For declining income in Central and Eastern Europe was accompanied in all
cases by increased post-tax and transfer income inequality, as Figure 1 shows.
The increase in inequality was particularly severe in Russia, Bulgaria and
2 See the results from the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer analysed e.g. in Hayo (1999).
4Latvia. In contrast, inequality hardly increased at all in any Western countries,
with the exception of the United Kingdom and the US, although already in the
1980s inequality was relatively high in those countries, as well as in Canada,
Spain and Australia.
Figure 1: Income inequality in selected Central and Eastern European and OECD countries
in the 1980s and 1990s (Gini coefficient)
Source: UNICEF (2001), LIS database (see www.lisproject.org/keyfigures/ineqtable.htm).
Accompanying the declines in GDP and the increases in inequality in most
CEE countries, the role of the state in society was increasingly called into
question. This debate was firstly ideological. After years of communism, and in
common with the dominant neo-liberal, market-oriented ideology in Western
countries during the 1990s, the preference for a ‘small state’ was often
expressed (Ferge, 1997).3 But it also had a pragmatic basis – post-communist
states were generally ineffective tax collectors. Because of this and because of
declining GDP, social services and welfare programmes were greatly cut back.
Therefore, both the logic of the transformation process and the fiscal restraints
under which governments operated severely limited the extent to which
3 Ferge (1997) makes the interesting point that at the time of the revolutions of 1956 in Budapest, and
1968 in Prague, ‘existing socialism’ as practiced in communist countries could be denounced as a
sham and criticised as such in the name of ‘socialism with a human face.’ But the international climate
of 1990 was different, and the rejection of ‘existing socialism’ was categorical.
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5governments could, or wished to, compensate the widening market driven
income dispersion.
Increasing income inequality per se, however, need not be bad from a
dynamic social welfare point of view (Bertola 2000; Bardhan et al. 2000). In the
case of transition countries, some increase in inequality was perhaps inevitable,
starting from a situation in which governments had compressed income
distribution to a greater extent than in western market economies, thereby
reducing incentives for individual effort.4 Indeed, a large share of increased
wage dispersion can be explained by higher returns to education (World Bank
2000, Newell and Reilly 1997). Given the steep increase in income inequality in
many countries however, the question arises as to whether the target has perhaps
been overshot. The degree to which income differences are beneficial from a
welfare point of view, and popularly accepted, does not solely depend on the
size of these differences, but also on what has caused them. Our results shed
some light on this by taking into account what people consider as the causes of
income generation and inequality in their societies.
3. Factors Determining Attitudes to Inequality, Getting
Ahead and Earnings: Data and Summary Results
§ 3.1 The International Social Survey Programme
 (ISSP) Data
In this analysis we examine, first, differences between the group of Western
industrialized countries and the group of transition countries in Central and
Eastern Europe; and second, we look at inter-country differences within the
group of transition countries. Our analysis is mostly aggregate – comparison of
scores for countries and groups of countries. But we also compare differences
between men and women, and between different age groups within countries.
The data used to measure attitudes to inequality are taken from the 1999
round of the ISSP including a total of 21 countries, of which eight are from
Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia,
Poland, Russia, Slovakia and Slovenia). In each country a sample of
approximately 1000 respondents was questioned on a range of topics of current
concern. Details of overall response rates and fieldwork methods are in Table
A1 in the Annex. In all of the countries in the East, face-to-face interviews were
used to obtain information from respondents, while in the West, mail surveys
were also extensively used. Not surprisingly, the response rate for mail surveys
is generally lower than that for face-to-face interviews. Spain, Bulgaria,
4 See e.g. Atkinson and Micklewright (1992).
6Slovakia and Portugal all enjoyed response rates of over 80 per cent. Japan,
Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, Austria, and New Zealand had response rates of
between 60 and 80 per cent. The remainder had response rates of less than 60
per cent. In terms of differences in attitudes to inequality between East and
West, the impact of response rates is difficult to assess. But the fact that there is
more variation within than between the two groups provides reason to believe
that the analysis is not systematically biased.
Included in the questionnaire were several questions relating to inequality. Of
these, we have selected 16 questions which are the focus of this analysis. A
summary statistic on these questions, respondent’s age and gender as well as
region is given in Annex Table A2. Table 1 lists the selected questions in detail.
Table 1 : Attitudinal statements used in this analysis and item response for each statement (per
cent sample)
Statement asked of respondents Valid(%)
Cluster A: Attitudes to inequality
1 ‘Large income differences are necessary for prosperity’ 93.5
2 ‘Differences in income are too large in your country’ 97.5
3 ‘It is the responsibility of government to reduce differences in incomesbetween people with high and low incomes’ 95.9
4 ‘Should richer people pay larger shares of taxes and poorer people lowershares’ 95.4
Cluster B: Criteria for getting ahead
5 ‘How important to getting ahead is coming from a wealthy family?’ 97.4
6 ‘How important to getting ahead is knowing the right people?’ 97.7
7 ‘In your country people get rewarded for their effort’ 96.9
 8  ‘In your country people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills’ 96.3
 9  ‘To get all the way to the top in your country you have to be corrupt’ 94.2
Cluster C: Determinants of earnings
In deciding how much people ought to earn, how important should each of these things be in
your opinion for determining pay:
10 ‘How much responsibility goes with the job’ 97.5
11 ‘Number of years spent in education’ 97.5
12 ‘Whether the job requires supervising others’ 96.7
13 ‘What is needed to support a family’ 96.4
14 ‘Whether the person has children to support’ 96.4
15 ‘How well a job is done’ 97.9
16 ‘How hard a person works at the job’ 97.7
Source: ISSP 1999.
The item response rates for each question were high, the lowest being for the
first attitude ‘Large income differences are necessary for prosperity’ (93.7% of
respondents answered). All the questions are in the form of statements to which
respondents are asked to register their attitude on a scale of 1 to 5. We classify
these 16 questions into three broad clusters. Cluster A covers attitudes to
7inequality (numbers 1 to 4). Cluster B deals with what people think are the
criteria for getting ahead in their country (numbers 5 to 9). And Cluster C relates
to what people think should be the determinants of earnings (numbers 10 to 16).
We discuss each of these in more detail below.
§ 3.2 Cluster A: attitudes to inequality
This cluster comprises four statements, all of which attempt to capture people’s
perception of and attitudes to inequality. The first statement is the most general
and abstract one: ‘Income differences are necessary for prosperity’. It addresses
the potential implications of income inequality and gets close to the issue of
whether people believe that there is an ‘optimal’ degree of inequality. A large
body of literature shows that the distribution of income can influence total
income in society. Some inequality may be positive for overall economic
development, but ‘too much’ of it can have harmful effects on growth (see e.g.
Deininger and Olinto 2000). The second statement tries to establish how people
assess the perceived amount of income inequality by asking about whether the
respondent finds that ‘differences in income are too large in your country’.
While statements 1 and 2 ask about attitudes to income distribution,
statements 3 and 4 are more concerned with attitudes to the redistribution of
income. Statement 3 suggests: ‘It is the responsibility of government to reduce
differences in incomes between people with high and low incomes’.5 One might
expect that those who consider the level of inequality in their society to be
tolerable will not see a need for governmental redistribution, unless, of course,
they are satisfied with the level of inequality in society because they believe it is
the result of government action. Statement 4 focuses on one way in which
governments can reduce income differences: ‘Richer people should pay larger
shares of taxes and poorer people lower shares’ – through progressive income
taxation.6
The correlation matrix in Table A3 shows that the four questions of the
cluster form a fairly consistent group. People who view large income differences
as necessary for prosperity are less likely to agree that the government should
reduce income differences, or that income differences in the country are too
large. And those who agree with the statement that governments should reduce
income differences are more likely to agree also that richer people should pay
larger shares of their incomes in taxes, and that income differences in the
country are too large.
5 An alternative would be that people believe it should be left to the trade unions, the employers, or
even the market forces themselves to bring about lower income inequality.
6 But note that there are other avenues open to governments and to society, to reduce income
differences. Indeed, even progressive taxation can be used to fund regressive public programmes. See
Commander and Lee (1998) for an example of this in the case of Russia.
8Table 2 summarises differences between East and West in terms of these four
attitudes and presents the respective t-statistics revealing the significance of the
difference between both regions. It shows that while a majority of people in both
CEECs and the West disagree with the statement that ‘income differences are
necessary for prosperity’, there is stronger disagreement in the CEECs. This
indicates a lower acceptance of inequality in the East. At the same time, 9 in 10
people in CEECs strongly agree or agree with the statement ‘income differences
are too large in your country’, compared with less than 8 in 10 in the West.
Responses to the third question also show strong differences between East and
West: 80% of people in the East agree with the statement that it is the
responsibility of government to reduce income differences between rich and
poor, compared with only 61 per cent in the West. In terms of the last statement,
that taxes should be progressive, there is a very high level of agreement among
respondents in both East and West (84% and 78% respectively). However, the
differences between Western and Eastern respondents are significant for all four
questions.
Table 2 : Attitudes to inequality in CEE and Western countries
Statement asked of respondents Response
Level of
significance
of
difference
CEE West
‘Income differences are necessary for prosperity’ (strongly disagree
and disagree) 69 54 <0.01
‘Differences in income are too large in your country’
(strongly agree and agree)
93 78 <0.01
‘It is the responsibility of government to reduce differences in incomes
between people with high and low incomes’ (strongly agree and agree) 80 61 <0.01
‘Should richer people pay larger shares of taxes and poorer people
lower shares?’ (much higher shares and higher shares) 84 78 <0.01
Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.
Overall, therefore, respondents in the East appear to have stronger negative
views on inequality than those in the West. There are several possible
explanations for this: disillusion in the East at the rapid pace of change and
growth in inequality; memory of more formally egalitarian times under
communism; a sense of personal material loss for a large number of respondents
in the East, who feel worse off at the end of the 1990s than they did at the start
of economic transition; and perhaps a sense of the unfairness of the transition
process – not only has there been an increase in inequality, but maybe the
redistribution process has been tainted by nepotism, cronyism and corruption.
9The following section sheds light on the latter potential cause of the higher
aversion to inequality in CEECs.
§ 3.3 Cluster B: criteria for getting ahead
This cluster comprises five questions, which go some way towards measuring
people’s perceptions of nepotism, cronyism and corruption – what they think it
takes to get ahead in their country. The full statements are listed on Table 1
above, and can be subdivided into two groups. The three statements ‘How
important to getting ahead is coming from a wealthy family?’, ‘How important
to getting ahead is knowing the right people?’ and ‘To get all the way to the top
in your country you need to be corrupt’, form one group – agreement with these
statements would suggest that skills, effort, etc. are not the most effective ways
of getting ahead. Who you know, rule bending and corruption appear to be much
more effective. The correlation matrix in Table A3 shows that there is a high
correlation between answers to all three questions.
The other two statements in this cluster are almost diametric opposites to the
first three: ‘In your country, people get rewarded for their effort’ and ‘in your
country, people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills’. Not only are
responses to these questions highly correlated with each other, but there is a
negative correlation between these questions and the other three in the cluster
(see Table A3). If people agree with these two statements, they are likely to
disagree with the other three statements in this group.
Table 3 shows that there is a significantly stronger agreement in the East than
in the West with the statements ‘How important to getting ahead is coming from
a wealthy family?’, ‘How important to getting ahead is knowing the right
people?’, and ‘To get all the way to the top in your country you have to be
corrupt’. Almost 40 per cent of respondents in the East view coming from a
wealthy family as important for getting ahead, compared with only 23 per cent
in the West. Almost six in ten respondents in the East view ‘knowing the right
people’ as important for getting ahead, compared with five in ten in the West.
And 52 per cent in the East believe that to get all the way to the top, you have to
be corrupt, a view held by only 29 per cent in the West.
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Table 3 : Attitudes to criteria for getting ahead in CEE and western countries
Statement asked of respondents Response
Level of
significance
of difference
CEE West
‘How important to getting ahead is coming from a wealthy family?’
(essential and very important) 39 23 <0.01
‘How important to getting ahead is knowing the right people?’
(essential and very important) 60 48 <0.01
‘In your country people get rewarded for their effort’ (strongly agree
and agree) 12 42 <0.01
‘In your country people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills’
(strongly agree and agree) 19 52 <0.01
‘To get all the way to the top in your country you have to be corrupt’
(strongly agree and agree) 52 29 <0.01
Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.
Moreover, people in the West (although still less than half) are much more
likely than those in the East to agree with the statements ‘in your country,
people get rewarded for their effort’ and ‘in your country, people get rewarded
for their intelligence and skills’. 42 and 52 per cent in the West agree with these
statements, respectively, compared with 12 and 19 per cent in the East. The
large differences between East and West on all five statements in this cluster
therefore suggest a considerably weaker belief in ‘merit’ in the East. Fewer
people in the East are willing to believe that hard work achieves results. Rather,
contacts, family networks, and perhaps a willingness to bend rules are seen as
the essential ingredients.
This profoundly negative view of achievement in post-communist society
may have originated in communist society itself (which had its share of
nepotism and corruption), or in the process of transition. It is reasonable to
suppose that the widespread experience of downward economic mobility in the
East is likely to have affected individual beliefs about the determinants of
individual success. For example, from a personal perspective, fewer people may
believe that effort pays off. And successful people (of whom there will be
relatively more in the West than in the East) may rationalise their own success in
terms of their own efforts (Piketty, 1995). But a large number of people may
also have experienced the impact of real cronyism or corruption. In Russia, for
example, ‘robber barons’ acquired vast deposits of mineral resources,
particularly oil and gas, with minimal payment to the state. We return to the
relationship between attitudes and corruption later in the paper.
There is potentially a close link between the questions in Cluster A and those
in Cluster B, in that those who perceive ‘getting ahead’ as based on achievement
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and ability criteria might be expected to see inequality in their society as
legitimate, compared to those who view getting ahead as largely determined by
ascription or illegitimate achievement (Robért 1999). The correlation matrix on
Table A3 shows that this is indeed the case. Responses to these two statements
are strongly positively correlated with the Cluster A statement ‘Large income
differences are necessary for prosperity’, and strongly negatively correlated with
the other three statements in Cluster A.
§ 3.4 Cluster C: earnings determinants
This group of statements is concerned with a narrower concept of ‘getting
ahead’. It focuses on what people believe should be the factors determining
earnings from employment. We can subdivide these questions: one group
concerns factors related to the job itself: ‘How much responsibility goes with the
job is important for determining pay’; ‘Number of years spent in education is
important for determining pay’; ‘Whether the job requires supervising others is
important for determining pay’; ‘How well a job is done is important for
determining pay’; and ‘How hard a person works at the job is important for
determining pay’. The other group concerns factors related to the need to
support a family or children. ‘What is needed to support a family is important
for determining pay’; and ‘Whether the person has children to support is
important for determining pay’.
The most important thing to note about Cluster C is that it comprises
normative statements about how earnings should be made (what should be...), in
contrast to Cluster B, which asks respondents to evaluate the actual situation in
which people get ahead (what is...) in their country. One might expect people’s
normative views to be influenced by, or indeed influence, their views on
inequality, and how one gets ahead. But as Table A3 shows, there is generally
little correlation between any of the statements in Cluster C and any of the
statements in either Cluster A or Cluster B. The exception regards the questions
on the importance of family and child support for determining pay. Respondents
who viewed the support of dependents as important, are also in favour of higher
income equality and government’s redistribution.
Table 4 shows that in the case of all 7 statements in this cluster, differences
between East and West are small. This suggests that people in both transition
and industrialized countries on average hold similar attitudes to how earnings
should be rewarded. There is no evidence of an overtly ‘socialist’ or
‘marketised’ set of attitudes to earnings in either group of countries.
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Table 4 : Attitudes to determinants of earnings in CEE and western countries
Statement asked of respondents Response
Level of
significance
of difference
CEE West
‘Responsibility is important for determining pay’ (essential and very
important) 76 77 <0.05
‘Number of years spent in education is important for determining pay’
(essential and very important) 55 51 <0.001
‘Whether the job requires supervising others is important for
determining pay’ (essential and very important) 50 51 <0.05
‘What is needed to support a family is important for determining pay’
(essential and very important) 48 49
not
significant
‘Whether the person has children to support is important for determining
pay’ (essential and very important) 45 42 <0.001
‘How well a job is done is important for determining pay’ (essential and
very important) 81 83 <0.001
‘How hard a person works at the job is important for determining pay’
(essential and very important) 75 75 <0.05
Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.
§ 3.5 Gender and age
Transition has arguably affected women and men differently. And marketised
economies have rarely been successful in promoting equality between men and
women. One impact of transition has arguably been to push women back
towards the domestic role that communism never really freed them from, but
expected them to manage in addition to full-time paid employment. With
transition, the latter role not only became more scarce, but in many countries
was popularly characterised as the man’s proper role, while the woman did the
nurturing and caring. The fact that there is very little difference,7 East or West,
between men’s and women’s attitudes to inequality, getting ahead or earnings
suggests that women in transition countries (as in the West) have not adopted
significantly different positions to men on these issues, irrespective of their own
personal gains or losses.
Surprisingly, differences between age groups are also, for the most part,
small in both East and West. But with regard to some statements, attitudes
among older respondents in the East (less so in the West) are stronger than those
of younger respondents. In Cluster A for example, almost 9 in 10 (88%) of
respondents aged 55 and over in the East agree with the statement ‘It is the
responsibility of government to reduce differences in incomes between people
with high and low incomes’, compared with three quarters of respondents aged
7 The results by gender and by age are summarised in Tables A4-A8 in the Annex.
13
up to 30. Similar proportions of older and younger respondents in the East (90
and 79 per cent, respectively) agree with the statement ‘Should richer people
pay larger shares of their incomes in taxes and poorer people lower shares?’ But
the fact that the responses of old and young respondents in the East are similar
to each other with respect to the other two statements in this cluster makes it
difficult to interpret the differences that do arise.
Differences in attitudes between younger and older respondents in both East
and West, though still not large, are apparent in the case of attitudes to what
should determine earnings (Cluster C). In both regions, older respondents are
more likely than younger ones to agree with the statements that education,
supervising others and how hard a person works should be important in
determining a person’s pay. But differences between older and younger
respondents are somewhat greater in the West than in the East on the attitudes
‘What is needed to support a family is important for determining pay’, and
‘whether the person has children to support is important for determining pay’: in
both cases, older respondents are more in agreement with these statements than
younger ones. In total, these results make sense: one might expect older people
to believe that factors other than the market should be important in determining
pay. But it should be emphasised that in general, the differences between old
and young are not very large.
This general absence of large differences between older and younger
respondents, in the East or in the West, is perhaps more surprising than the
similarities between men’s and women’s views. One might expect generational
differences for several reasons, not least differences in life experience. And one
might expect that the process of transition, and the way it might be seen through
older and younger eyes, would sharpen these differences. For the most part, this
does not appear to have happened.
4. Differences Between Countries
While the differences between East and West shown in Section 3 are striking,
they hide some interesting country-specific differences. In this section, we
highlight some of the variations between both Eastern and Western countries.
§ 4.1 Cluster A: attitudes to inequality
Table 5 shows the percentage of respondents expressing ‘against inequality’
opinions across the four attitudes in Cluster A. They are ranked according to the
average percentage of respondents with these opinions. Bulgarian and Russian
respondents appear to have the most egalitarian attitudes (the average score is
86%), but they are closely followed by the Portuguese, and then the Hungarians,
Slovenians, Slovakians, Latvians and Poles. Egalitarian attitudes in the Czech
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Republic, on the other hand, fall behind those in Austria and Spain, but are still
quite high – three quarters of Czechs have egalitarian opinions. At the other end
of the scale, respondents from Canada, New Zealand and Australia show lower
concerns regarding societal inequality. People living in the USA are at the
bottom of the scale and therefore appear to be most relaxed about inequality.
These results generally support the ‘East-West’ differences discussed in the
previous section. But they also reveal considerable heterogeneity within both
groups of countries. Portugal, for example, appears to have more in common
with transition countries in terms of attitudes to inequality, while perhaps the
opposite may be said of the Czech Republic. But it is also worth noting that the
transition countries are more homogenous in terms of their attitudes: the range
of average scores for this group is from 75 to 87 per cent. The range of scores
for Western countries is from 52 to 84 per cent. On the key attitude ‘Differences
in income in your country are too large’, the lowest percentage in agreement in
the transition countries is 88 per cent in the Czech Republic. But the proportion
in agreement reaches a level below or about 70 per cent in four Western
countries – Japan, Canada, Australia and the USA. Inequality may be a burning
issue in most Western countries, but it is in all transition countries.
What drives these results? It does not appear to be the level of inequality per
se, as the example of the USA shows. Could it be the perceived causes of
inequality? If gains by well-off people are perceived as ‘ill-gotten’, could it be
that resistance to inequality is greater? Appendix Table A3 suggests that this
may be the case – there is significant correlation between the four attitudes in
this cluster and the attitude in Cluster B ‘To get all the way to the top in your
country you have to be corrupt’.
Another explanation might be the high increase of inequality in transition
countries, leading to the impoverishment of a high proportion of people in
transition countries. The newly poor and those who have lost most during
transition are perhaps more likely to favour income redistribution that reduces
their relatively new burden of economic insecurity. Hence, many poor people in
transition countries may not have fully adjusted to their relatively new
circumstances. On the other hand, inequalities in Western countries remained
fairly constant during the last decade. It may be that poor respondents in these
countries simply got used to inequality or accept it as necessary for economic
growth.
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Table 5: Respondents expressing egalitarian attitudes, by country (per cent)
Large differences
in income are
necessary for
prosperity
Differences in
income in your
country are too
large
It is the
responsibility of
government to
reduce differences
in incomes
Richer people
should pay larger
shares of taxes,
and poorer people
smaller shares
Average
percentage
score
Disagree/strongly
disagree
Agree/strongly
agree
Agree/strongly
agree
Agree/strongly
agree
Bulgaria 72.7 96.85 85.02 92.69 86.8
Russia 73.8 95.48 86.15 90.51 86.5
Portugal 59.4 96.04 89.88 88.3 83.4
Hungary 75.5 93.08 80.08 83.96 83.2
Slovenia 63.9 90.99 84.82 87.74 81.9
Slovakia 78.3 93.67 74.54 80.65 81.8
Latvia 70.5 96.7 78.67 72.66 79.6
Poland 57.3 89.11 84.86 85.24 79.1
Austria 65.0 86.18 72.49 84.91 77.2
Spain 51.8 89.29 79.29 84.55 76.2
Czech Rep. 63.8 87.76 71.88 77.95 75.3
France 65.1 87.41 67.53 73.26 73.3
Great
Britain 57.8 82.35 68.72 78.71 71.9
Germany 48.2 82.17 61.24 80.28 68.0
Norway 57.0 72.48 61.91 76.03 66.9
Sweden 49.0 71.11 59.46 76.31 64.0
Japan 40.7 69.15 52.55 90.97 63.3
Canada 64.7 70.6 47.48 69.18 63.0
New
Zealand 61.0 73.15 49.43 62.51 61.5
Australia 46.3 70.89 49.69 77.9 61.2
USA 42.7 66.16 35.26 64.96 52.3
Average 66.5 92.3 80.7 84.5 81.0
Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.
Note: The average refers to the unweighted average of countries.
§ 4.2 Cluster B: criteria for getting ahead
Table 6 shows the proportions of respondents in each country who are in
agreement or disagreement (depending on the attitude expressed)8 with the five
criteria for getting ahead that make up this cluster. This table is also ranked
according to average percentage scores for each country across the five attitudes
in the cluster. Again, countries in the East dominate at the top of the table, while
those in the West take all the places in the bottom half. But again, there is
8 The ranking criteria is that those countries are on top which believe most in the fact that non-
meritocratic principles are the main drivers for actually getting ahead in these countries.
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tremendous variation within East and West. In particular, Portugal and Spain are
more like the transition countries in their attitudes than like other Western
countries. The range of percentages in agreement or disagreement with each
attitude is wide. Fewer than one in five Czechs think that coming from a wealthy
family is important for getting ahead, while more than three in five Poles think
so. Nine in ten Bulgarians disagree with the statement ‘In your country people
get rewarded for their intelligence and skills’ compared with four in ten
Hungarians and three in ten Poles. Nonetheless, more than half Poles (57%) and
Slovakians (53%) agree with the statement that ‘To get all the way to the top in
your country, you have to be corrupt’, as do two in three Bulgarians and four in
five Russians.
Table 6 : Respondents who do not think meritocratic principles apply, by country (per cent)
‘How
important to
getting ahead
is coming from
a wealthy
family?’
‘How
important to
getting ahead
is knowing the
right people?’
‘In your
country people
get rewarded
for their effort’
‘In your
country people
get rewarded
for their
intelligence
and skills’
‘To get all the
way to the top
in your country
you have to be
corrupt’
Average
Essential/very
important
Essential/very
important
Strongly
disagree/
Disagree
Strongly
disagree/
Disagree
Strongly
agree/Agree
Bulgaria 54.9 63.3 91.0 90.0 65.8 73.0
Russia 43.5 63.1 83.6 80.1 80.8 70.2
Slovakia 47.1 75.0 83.4 72.7 52.8 66.2
Poland 60.6 74.4 45.7 30.7 56.6 53.6
Latvia 37.1 59.5 69.1 59.6 40.5 53.2
Portugal 55.5 61.2 53.9 41.2 40.7 50.5
Slovenia 26.7 60.0 61.5 52.5 42.2 48.6
Spain 54.4 66.0 43.9 34.3 35.0 46.7
Czech Rep. 19.4 48.8 65.1 50.3 38.9 44.5
Hungary 35.4 42.5 71.3 40.3 31.8 44.3
Austria 28.5 71.5 25.2 18.5 47.6 38.3
France 10.2 42.2 50.3 39.5 40.9 36.6
Germany 26.6 60.9 18.6 14.5 42.9 32.7
Sweden 19.0 56.5 26.1 19.9 20.7 28.4
Great
Britain 19.4 42.0 31.6 24.8 18.1 27.2
New
Zealand 16.9 36.5 30.8 23.5 18.2 25.2
Norway 10.8 33.3 37.8 30.3 10.8 24.6
Canada 13.2 49.0 21.3 19.9 17.9 24.3
Japan 12.2 19.7 24.2 16.1 41.2 22.7
Australia 20.9 39.7 18.4 14.6 17.1 22.1
USA 20.5 47.2 12.0 8.9 17.1 21.1
Average 29.4 52.3 46.6 37.7 37.5 40.7
Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.
Note: The average refers to the unweighted average of countries.
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Concerning Cluster A above we argued that attitudes to inequality are not
closely related to ‘actual’ inequality, because a given level of inequality may
well be judged differently depending on the (e.g. fair or unfair) means by which
it was generated. In the present Cluster B, however, it is straightforward to
expect that this link between perception/attitude and reality (here: of the degree
to which meritocratic principles are actually applied in society) will be much
stronger. This is because there is much less disagreement that for instance
corruption – as one example of a non-meritocratic criteria for getting ahead – is
a ‘bad’ (as opposed to a ‘good’), irrespective of how it has come about in the
first place. As it turns out from Figure 2 there is indeed a relatively close
empirical relationship between the ‘actual’ level of corruption and the
perception of it in the eyes of the respondents (as measured by the share of
respondents that agree or strongly agree with the view that ‘to get all the way to
the top you have to be corrupt’).
Figure 2: Views on corruption as a means to getting ahead by ‘actual’ corruption
Source: Table 12, Transparency International (2001).
Note: T-values appear in parentheses.
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§ 4.3 Cluster C: values concerning determinants of
            earning
Table 7 shows country-by-country responses to the seven attitudes that make up
the cluster on earnings determinants. The country-specific average for
respondents who think objective principles should apply in the determination of
earnings is calculated by omitting the questions concerning the importance of
child and family support, the answers to which are hard to reconcile with those
to the other questions in this cluster.
Unlike the other two Clusters (A+B) examined in this section, there is no
discernible pattern between East and West, as was already visible from the
regional aggregate results in Table 4. Respondents in the USA, Portugal, Austria
and New Zealand show the highest level of agreement with the five attitudes
(deeming them ‘essential’ or ‘very important’), followed by Russians, Germans
and Bulgarians.
These results are not easy to interpret. A priori one might expect a certain
link between Cluster B and the questions in this cluster, since what people
believe should be important (for pay or for ‘getting ahead’ more generally) will
be somehow related to what they believe is important. But just how precisely
would they be linked? As Table 2 had already indicated, the relation does not
seem to be a very simple one, since correlations between the attitudes in this
cluster and in the other clusters are generally low.
One hypothesis would be that people who were concerned about inequality
and corruption might strongly favour ‘objective’ criteria (for example,
education, supervision of others, hard work, or even family responsibilities) as
means of determining earnings. One might equally expect that in the transition
context, many of the ‘losers’ would favour objective criteria: for example,
skilled industrial workers who lost their jobs, or who found their earnings
progressively eroded.9 Yet in none of the seven attitudes in this cluster are
transition countries concentrated at the top of the table. Nevertheless, they are
neither at the bottom of the ranking, which suggests that there may indeed be
some truth in this hypothesis, in particular when looking at Russia and Bulgaria,
who had perceived strongest the presence of non-meritocratic principles in their
societies (see Cluster B) and now also rank among the upper third in Cluster C.
This clashes, however, with the example of Slovenia, whose respondents have
shown much discontent with the non-meritocratic way in which incomes are
generated, but who at the same time do not seem to cry out all too strongly for
9 Additionally, transition countries are often characterised by a poor fit between ‘objective’ labour
market criteria (such as education or skill) and rewards for work (World Bank 2000). Hence, while in
Western countries higher education decreases the risk of poverty, this relationship is more uncertain in
the East. Therefore, it appears that respondents in the East who are subject to what they perceive to be
arbitrary wage determinants might be more in favour of ‘objective’ principals for determining pay.
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more emphasis on objective determinants of pay. This may suggest a degree of
resignation or acceptance on how earnings should be determined.
Table 7: Respondents who think ‘objective’ principles should apply in the determination of
earnings, by country (per cent)
‘How much
responsibility
goes with the
job is important
for determining
pay’
‘Number of
years spent
in education
is important
for
determining
pay’
‘Whether the
job requires
supervising
others is
important for
determining
pay’
‘What is
needed to
support a
family is
important for
determining
pay’
‘Whether the
person has
children to
support is
important for
determining
pay’
How well a
job is done is
important for
determining
pay’
‘How hard a
person works
at the job is
important for
determining
pay’
Average
Essential/very important
USA 82.4 69.1 63.8 61.0 44.2 91.8 88.6 79.1
Portugal 86.0 64.8 67.3 44.9 44.5 80.6 80.2 75.8
Austria 86.8 61.9 50.0 49.3 53.3 91.2 78.9 73.8
New
Zealand 81.4 54.8 58.9 49.7 37.0 88.6 82.7 73.3
Russia 85.1 59.2 55.0 58.2 51.7 83.8 79.3 72.5
Germany 87.9 60.7 42.7 56.4 64.5 91.4 79.5 72.4
Bulgaria 80.3 69.4 60.3 55.2 57.2 80.1 71.9 72.4
Australia 79.6 56.4 60.1 36.1 21.1 85.2 75.8 71.4
Slovakia 87.3 50.6 48.4 53.8 45.3 86.6 76.9 70.0
Canada 78.0 54.1 48.9 55.1 34.5 86.0 80.1 69.4
Great
Britain 75.8 55.8 58.0 57.9 35.8 78.4 76.3 68.9
Poland 67.5 64.1 50.6 39.2 32.5 76.6 77.7 67.3
Hungary 72.2 49.3 46.7 43.3 40.5 83.5 80.7 66.5
Czech R. 75.6 48.5 45.7 39.0 34.3 80.9 77.2 65.6
Latvia 72.3 49.9 53.7 53.8 58.3 79.9 70.7 65.3
Spain 65.6 56.1 47.5 63.0 62.5 74.1 73.8 63.4
Sweden 76.1 41.1 52.9 30.7 26.7 81.2 61.9 62.6
Norway 68.6 43.7 48.9 45.9 37.8 75.4 75.6 62.4
France 69.6 39.4 50.8 60.5 49.5 79.5 59.7 59.8
Slovenia 66.6 51.6 41.1 45.7 48.8 72.9 65.1 59.4
Japan 73.1 11.6 19.7 33.4 33.0 79.8 68.4 50.5
Average 77.0 53.0 51.0 49.1 43.5 82.3 75.3 67.7
Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.
Note: The average refers to the unweighted average of countries. It does not comprise the
questions whether the support of a family or of children is important for determining pay,
since neither the support of children nor of a family is directly work related.
A different explanation seems to hold for the USA, where respondents are
most tolerant towards inequality (Table 5), believe more than any other country
that getting ahead is subject to meritocratic principles (Table 6), while at the
same time they seem to have the strongest conviction that objective criteria
should be applied in determining pay in the market (Table 7). Hence, in this
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particular case the perceived reality and the ideology of a free market economy
are in unique concordance.
To summarise, Table 8 shows average scores for countries in the three
clusters in a different way. The purpose of this table is to show which countries
hold the most ‘extreme’ or ‘unusual’ views altogether. Countries score 1, 0 or –1
in respect of each attitude in a cluster, and these scores are aggregated within
and across clusters in the table. A score of 1 is awarded to a country if the
percentage of respondents in that country agreeing or strongly agreeing (or
disagreeing, or finding essential or very important, as the case may be in Tables
5-7) with an attitude is greater than one standard deviation above the mean for
all countries. A score of –1 is given if the percentage is more than one standard
deviation below the mean. Therefore, a score of 1 or –1 represents ‘outlier’
countries, while a score of 0 is given to countries that fall within one standard
deviation of the mean. The countries are ranked by the sum of scores for each
cluster.
Table 8 shows that in terms of ‘outlier’ scores, Bulgaria, Russia, Portugal,
Slovakia, Austria and Hungary are at the top of all the three clusters taken
together. In these six countries, views on inequality, what is needed to get ahead
and earnings, are overall most strongly held. Among the countries at the
opposite extreme, i.e. those who tend to be ‘extremely’ tolerant towards the
existing income differences and their determinants, are exclusively
industrialized market economies, such as first Canada, followed by Japan,
Norway, Australia, France and the USA. Note that given the less than perfect
correlation between Clusters A and B on one hand, and Cluster C on the other
hand, the overall ranking of outlier countries would look somewhat different if
we were to focus on the first two clusters solely – especially for the USA. A
further examination of the precise nature of the relationship between Clusters
A+B and Cluster C, in order to find out what is it that makes people call more
actively for a certain policy change, could well be an area of fruitful future
research.
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Table 8: ‘Outlier’ scores for attitudes summed across clusters, by country
Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C TOTAL
Bulgaria 4 4 1 9
Russia 4 3 1 8
Portugal 2 2 2 6
Slovakia 1 3 1 5
Austria 0 1 2 3
Hungary 1 1 0 2
Latvia 1 0 0 1
Poland 0 3 -2 1
Czech Rep. 0 0 0 0
Germany -1 -1 2 0
Spain 0 1 -2 -1
Great Britain 0 -1 0 -1
Slovenia 1 0 -4 -3
Sweden -2 0 -1 -3
New Zealand -3 -2 2 -3
USA -4 -3 4 -3
France 0 -1 -3 -4
Australia -3 -2 0 -5
Norway -1 -3 -2 -6
Japan -2 -2 -2 -6
Canada -3 -3 0 -6
Source: Tables 5-7.
Notes: for derivation of scores, see description in text.
5. Conclusion
Our main purpose in this paper was to examine how, ten years after the collapse
of the Iron Curtain, attitudes to inequality in Central and Eastern Europe
compared with those in the West. Our main conclusion is that inequality in the
East is perceived in considerably more negative terms than in the West. We also
found that compared to people in the West, people in the East have a very
jaundiced view as to what it takes to get ahead in their countries. People in the
East are more likely to agree that contacts and corruption are important for
getting ahead. This certainly explains at least part of their greater aversion
towards existing levels of income inequality.
At the same time, we found no substantial East-West differences in the level
of support for ‘objective’ criteria in terms of earnings determinants. People in
both East and West appear to share basically the same views as to how earnings
should be determined, while they differ markedly in the evaluation of actual
determinants. This points to an important possibility: people in the East may be
disillusioned with the level of inequality in their society at least partly because
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they see it as the result of unfairness and ill-gotten gains. From the reverse point
of view this most likely implies that they are in principle prepared to accept a
given level of inequality (perhaps even substantial inequality, which occurs in
many Western countries), if it is not predominantly caused by ‘unjustified’ or
‘unethical’ means. The challenge for policymakers in the transition countries is
to introduce the principles of ‘fairness’ and ‘equal opportunity’ in the market,
not least in order to ensure sustained public support for and legitimacy of
policies in general.
Examination at the country-level of the three clusters of attitudes in this
analysis sheds further light on the issue of corruption and legitimacy.
Respondents in Russia and Bulgaria, followed by Portugal, Slovakia, Latvia,
Poland and Austria, on average hold the strongest views against inequality,
about corruption and about objective criteria for determining earnings. In all of
these countries except Austria, perceptions of corruption are high. Inequality is
clearly an important issue in itself, but when linked in people’s minds to
corruption, it can become an issue for the legitimacy of social and economic
reforms.
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ANNEX
Table A1: Response rate of the questionnaires and fieldwork methods by countries
Country Response Rate (%) Fieldwork method
Australia 40.1 Mail survey with four follow-up mailings
Austria 63.3 Face to face interview
Bulgaria 91.8 Face to face interview
Canada 21.9 Mail survey with one reminder
Czech Rep. 48.9 Face to face interview
France 18.1 Mail survey
Germany 56.2** Self-completion of questionnaire distributed byinterviewer
Great Britain 40.2 Face-to-face interview
Hungary 64.6 Face-to-face interview
Japan 73.6 Self-completion (Dropping off and later pickingup questionnaires)
Latvia 56.3 Face-to-face interview
New Zealand 60.5 Mail survey with two follow-up mailings
Norway 52.84 Mail survey with one reminder and two follow-ups with questionnaire
Poland 66.5 Face-to-face interview
Portugal 80.1 Face-to-face interview
Russia 57.8 Face-to-face interview
Slovakia 90.2 Face-to-face interview
Slovenia 64.9* Face-to-face interview
Spain 98.5 Face-to-face interview
Sweden 57.5 Mail survey with four reminders
USA 43.4 Face-to-face interview
The sample type for selecting respondents differs throughout the countries.
Response rate refers to the general questionnaire and not only the ISSP module.
** Response rate refers to the surveys ISSP 1999 and ISSP 2000 together.
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Table A2: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Weight Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 26323 26339.8 45.66 17.06 16 98
Gender (female=2) 26372 26387.2 1.53 0.50 1 2
Income differences necessary for
prosperity
24608 24607.5 3.61 1.14 1 5
Differences in income too large 25749 25771.2 1.76 0.92 1 5
Government’s responsibility reduce
taxes
25285 25283.0 2.20 1.18 1 5
Richer people should pay more taxes 25151 25193.6 1.91 0.76 1 5
Determining pay: responsibility 25701 25731.1 1.96 0.76 1 5
Determining pay: education 25705 25733.5 2.47 0.91 1 5
Determining pay: supervising 25458 25484.8 2.49 0.88 1 5
Determining pay: family 25340 25384.8 2.60 1.09 1 5
Determining pay: children 25346 25375.8 2.78 1.15 1 5
Determining pay: well job done 25809 25832.5 1.85 0.75 1 5
Determining pay: hard work 25756 25787.9 2.00 0.80 1 5
Getting ahead: wealthy family 25651 25678.0 3.11 1.13 1 5
Getting ahead: knowing right people 25757 25772.8 2.47 0.99 1 5
Getting ahead: effort 25526 25551.7 3.30 1.16 1 5
Getting ahead: intelligence, skills 25350 25380.4 3.07 1.15 1 5
Getting ahead: corrupt 24728 24750.1 3.04 1.26 1 5
OECD countries 26437 26452.1 0.62 0.49 0 1
CEE countries 26437 26452.1 0.38 0.49 0 1
Source: ISSP 1999.
Table A3 : Correlation matrix
Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C
Income
differences
necessary
Income
diff. too
large
Govt..
reduce
income
diff.
Richer
more
taxes
Get
ahead:
wealthy
family
Get
ahead:
right
people
Get
ahead:
effort
Get
ahead
skills
Get
ahead:
corrupt
Pay:
respon-
sibility
Pay:
educa-
tion
Pay:
supervi
sing
Pay:
family
Pay:
children
Pay:
well
done
job
Pay:
hard
work
Income differences necessary 1.00
Income difference too large -0.27 1.00
Govt reduce income differences -0.22 0.56 1.00Cl
us
te
r
A
Richer more taxes -0.15 0.32 0.36 1.00
Get ahead: wealthy family -0.02 0.15 0.17 0.13 1.00
Get ahead: right people -0.03 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.48 1.00
Get ahead: effort 0.24 -0.30 -0.25 -0.17 -0.12 -0.12 1.00
Get ahead: intelligence skills 0.22 -0.25 -0.21 -0.14 -0.09 -0.11 0.69 1.00Cl
us
te
r B
Get ahead: corrupt -0.05 0.24 0.25 0.18 0.22 0.24 -0.31 -0.28 1.00
Pay: responsibility 0.01 0.02 -0.03 n.s. 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 1.00
Pay: education 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.30 1.00
Pay: supervising 0.06 0.01 0.00 n.s. 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.34 0.38 1.00
Pay: family -0.03 0.16 0.20 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.21 0.12 1.00
Pay: children -0.02 0.18 0.23 0.16 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.19 0.09 0.74 1.00
Pay: well done job -0.04 0.03 -0.03 n.s. 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.37 0.16 0.23 0.08 0.08 1.00C
lu
ste
r C
Pay: hard work -0.03 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.28 0.21 0.22 0.16 0.16 0.58 1.00
Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.
Note: Bold correlation coefficients refer to a significance at a 1% level, n.s.= not significant.
Table A4: Attitudes to inequality in CEE and western countries by gender
Statement asked of respondents Response
CEE West
Male Female Male Female
‘Income differences are necessary for prosperity’
(strongly disagree and disagree)
69 70 52 56
‘Differences in income are too large in your country’
(strongly agree and agree)
92 94 76 81
‘It is the responsibility of government to reduce
differences in incomes between people with high and
low incomes’ (strongly agree and agree)
78 83 57 64
‘Richer people, higher taxes’ (much higher shares and
higher shares)
82 86 78 78
Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.
Table A5: Attitudes to inequality in CEE and western countries by age
Statement asked of respondents Response
CEE West
Age categories -30 31-54 55+ -30 31-54 55+
‘Income differences are necessary for prosperity’
(strongly disagree and disagree)
66 70 71 54 56 51
‘Differences in income are too large in your country’
(strongly agree and agree)
91 93 94 74 78 83
‘It is the responsibility of government to reduce
differences in incomes between people with high and
low incomes’ (strongly agree and agree)
75 79 86 60 59 64
‘Richer people, higher taxes’ (much higher shares and
higher shares)
79 82 90 74 76 82
Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.
Table A6: Attitudes to criteria for status attainment in CEE and western countries by
gender
Statement asked of respondents Response
CEE West
Male Female Male Female
‘How important to getting ahead is coming from a
wealthy family?’ (essential and very important)
41 37 25 21
‘How important to getting ahead is knowing the right
people?’ (essential and very important)
62 58 49 46
‘In your country people get rewarded for their effort’
(strongly agree and agree)
13 11 45 40
‘In your country people get rewarded for their
intelligence and skills’ (strongly agree and agree)
20 18 54 50
‘To get all the way to the top in your country you have
to be corrupt’ (strongly agree and agree)
53 51 29 28
Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.
Table A7: Attitudes to criteria for status attainment in CEE and western countries by age
Statement asked of respondents Response
CEE West
Age categories -30 31-54 55+ -30 31-54 55+
‘How important to getting ahead is coming from a
wealthy family?’ (essential and very important)
39 39 40 21 23 25
‘How important to getting ahead is knowing the right
people?’ (essential and very important)
62 61 58 50 47 47
‘In your country people get rewarded for their effort’
(strongly agree and agree)
12 12 13 41 40 46
‘In your country people get rewarded for their
intelligence and skills’ (strongly agree and agree)
18 18 20 51 49 56
‘To get all the way to the top in your country you have
to be corrupt’ (strongly agree and agree)
51 51 54 28 30 29
Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.
Table A8: Attitudes to determinants of earnings in CEE and western countries by
gender
Statement asked of respondents Response
CEE West
Male Female Male Female
‘Responsibility is important for determining pay’
(essential and very important)
76 75 77 79
‘Number of years spent in education is important for
determining pay’ (essential and very important)
53 58 45 52
‘Whether the job requires supervising others is
important for determining pay’ (essential and very
important)
51 50 47 49
‘What is needed to support a family is important for
determining pay’ (essential and very important)
47 48 45 49
‘Whether the person has children to support is
important for determining pay’ (essential and very
important)
44 46 40 46
‘How well a job is done is important for determining
pay’ (essential and very important)
81 80 83 83
‘How hard a person works at the job is important for
determining pay’ (essential and very important)
75 75 71 75
Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.
Table A9: Attitudes to determinants of earnings in CEE and western countries by age
Statement asked of respondents Response
CEE West
Age categories -30 31-54 55+ -30 31-54 55+
‘Responsibility is important for determining pay’
(essential and very important)
73 75 75 78 78 79
‘Number of years spent in education is important for
determining pay’ (essential and very important)
52 55 61 48 46 55
‘Whether the job requires supervising others is
important for determining pay’ (essential and very
important)
46 49 55 47 47 53
‘What is needed to support a family is important for
determining pay’ (essential and very important)
45 47 50 46 44 53
‘Whether the person has children to support is
important for determining pay’ (essential and very
important)
44 45 48 41 40 46
‘How well a job is done is important for determining
pay’ (essential and very important)
78 80 81 83 82 84
‘How hard a person works at the job is important for
determining pay’ (essential and very important)
71 74 78 75 73 75
Source: ISSP 1999, own calculations.
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